Flash Encryption
================

{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT:default="SPI_BOOT_CRYPT_CNT",esp32="FLASH_CRYPT_CNT"}

{IDF_TARGET_ESP32_V3_ONLY:default="", esp32="(ESP32 V3 only)"}

{IDF_TARGET_ENCRYPT_COMMAND:default="idf.py secure-encrypt-flash-data --aes-xts", esp32="idf.py secure-encrypt-flash-data"}

:link_to_translation:`zh_CN:[中文]`

This is a quick start guide to {IDF_TARGET_NAME}'s flash encryption feature. Using application code as an example, it demonstrates how to test and verify flash encryption operations during development and production.

.. note::

    In this guide, most used commands are in the form of ``idf.py secure-<command>``, which is a wrapper around corresponding ``espsecure <command>``. The ``idf.py`` based commands provide a more user-friendly experience, although may lack some of the advanced functionality of their ``espsecure`` based counterparts.

Introduction
------------

Flash encryption is intended for encrypting the contents of the {IDF_TARGET_NAME}'s off-chip flash memory. Once this feature is enabled, firmware is flashed as plaintext, and then the data is encrypted in place on the first boot. As a result, physical readout of flash will not be sufficient to recover most flash contents.

.. only:: esp32

    :doc:`Secure Boot <secure-boot-v2>` is a separate feature which can be used together with flash encryption to create an even more secure environment.

.. important::

    For production use, flash encryption should be enabled in the release mode only.

.. important::

    Enabling flash encryption limits the options for further updates of {IDF_TARGET_NAME}. Before using this feature, read the document and make sure to understand the implications.

.. _encrypted-partitions:

Encrypted Partitions
--------------------

With flash encryption enabled, the following types of data are encrypted by default:

- :ref:`second-stage-bootloader`
- Partition Table
- :ref:`nvs_encr_key_partition`
- Otadata
- All ``app`` type partitions

Other types of data can be encrypted conditionally:

- Any partition marked with the ``encrypted`` flag in the partition table. For details, see :ref:`encrypted-partition-flag`.
- Secure Boot bootloader digest if Secure Boot is enabled (see below).

.. _flash-encryption-efuse:

Relevant eFuses
---------------

The flash encryption operation is controlled by various eFuses available on {IDF_TARGET_NAME}. The list of eFuses and their descriptions is given in the table below. The names in eFuse column are also used by ``espefuse`` tool and ``idf.py`` based eFuse commands. For usage in the eFuse API, modify the name by adding ``ESP_EFUSE_``, for example: esp_efuse_read_field_bit (ESP_EFUSE_DISABLE_DL_ENCRYPT).

.. Comment: As text in cells of list-table header rows does not wrap, it is necessary to make 0 header rows and apply bold typeface to the first row. Otherwise, the table goes beyond the html page limits on the right.

.. only:: not SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES

    .. list-table:: eFuses Used in Flash Encryption
       :widths: 25 40 10
       :header-rows: 0

       * - **eFuse**
         - **Description**
         - **Bit Depth**
       * - ``CODING_SCHEME``
         - Controls actual number of block1 bits used to derive final 256-bit AES key. Possible values: ``0`` for 256 bits, ``1`` for 192 bits, ``2`` for 128 bits. Final AES key is derived based on the ``FLASH_CRYPT_CONFIG`` value.
         - 2
       * - ``flash_encryption`` (block1)
         - AES key storage.
         - 256-bit key block
       * - ``FLASH_CRYPT_CONFIG``
         - Controls the AES encryption process.
         - 4
       * - ``DISABLE_DL_ENCRYPT``
         - If set, disables flash encryption operation while running in Firmware Download mode.
         - 1
       * - ``DISABLE_DL_DECRYPT``
         - If set, disables flash decryption while running in UART Firmware Download mode.
         - 1
       * - ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}``
         - A :math:`2^n` number indicating whether the contents of flash have been encrypted.

           * If an odd number of bits are set (e.g., ``0b0000001`` or ``0b0000111``), this indicates the contents of flash are encrypted. The contents will need to be transparently decrypted when read.
           * If an even number of bits are set (e.g., ``0b0000000`` or ``0b0000011``), this indicates the contents of flash are unencrypted (i.e., plain text).

           With each successive unencrypted flash update (e.g., flashing a new unencrypted binary) and encryption of the flash (via the :ref:`Enable flash encryption on boot <CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENC_ENABLED>` option), the next MSB of ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` is set.
         - 7


.. only:: SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_256 and SOC_KEY_MANAGER_SUPPORTED

    .. list-table:: eFuses Used in Flash Encryption
       :widths: 25 40 10
       :header-rows: 0

       * - **eFuse**
         - **Description**
         - **Bit Depth**
       * - ``BLOCK_KEYN``
         - AES key storage. N is between 0 and 5. When using a Key Manager-based key, this eFuse is not used.
         - One 256-bit key block for XTS_AES_128; two 256-bit key blocks for XTS_AES_256 (512-bit total).
       * - ``KEY_PURPOSE_N``
         - Controls the purpose of eFuse block ``BLOCK_KEYN``, where N is between 0 and 5. Possible values: ``2`` for ``XTS_AES_256_KEY_1``, ``3`` for ``XTS_AES_256_KEY_2``, and ``4`` for ``XTS_AES_128_KEY``. Final AES key is derived based on the value of one or two of these purpose eFuses. For a detailed description of the possible combinations, see **{IDF_TARGET_NAME} Technical Reference Manual** > **External Memory Encryption and Decryption (XTS_AES)** [`PDF <{IDF_TARGET_TRM_EN_URL}#extmemencr>`__]. When enabling Flash Encryption using a Key Manager-based key, this eFuse is not used.
         - 4
       * - ``KM_XTS_KEY_LENGTH_256``
         - When enabling Flash Encryption using a Key Manager-based key, this eFuse is used to control the length of the XTS-AES key. Set this eFuse to 1 to use a 128-bit key, and to 0 to use a 256-bit key. This eFuse field is unused when enabling Flash Encryption using an eFuse-based key.
         - 1
       * - ``FORCE_USE_KEY_MANAGER_KEY``
         - When enabling Flash Encryption using a Key Manager-based key, this eFuse is used to force the Key Manager to use the XTS-AES key. Set the bit 1 of this eFuse to use the Key Manager-based key. This eFuse field is unused when enabling Flash Encryption using an eFuse-based key.
         - 1
       * - ``DIS_DOWNLOAD_MANUAL_ENCRYPT``
         - If set, disables Flash Encryption when in download bootmodes.
         - 1
       * - ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}``
         - Enables encryption and decryption, when an SPI boot mode is set. Feature is enabled if 1 or 3 bits are set in the eFuse, disabled otherwise.
         - 3

.. only:: SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_256 and not SOC_KEY_MANAGER_SUPPORTED

    .. list-table:: eFuses Used in Flash Encryption
       :widths: 25 40 10
       :header-rows: 0

       * - **eFuse**
         - **Description**
         - **Bit Depth**
       * - ``BLOCK_KEYN``
         - AES key storage. N is between 0 and 5.
         - One 256-bit key block for XTS_AES_128, Two 256-bit key blocks for XTS_AES_256 (512 bit total)
       * - ``KEY_PURPOSE_N``
         - Controls the purpose of eFuse block ``BLOCK_KEYN``, where N is between 0 and 5. Possible values: ``2`` for ``XTS_AES_256_KEY_1`` , ``3`` for ``XTS_AES_256_KEY_2``, and ``4`` for ``XTS_AES_128_KEY``. Final AES key is derived based on the value of one or two of these purpose eFuses. For a detailed description of the possible combinations, see **{IDF_TARGET_NAME} Technical Reference Manual** > **External Memory Encryption and Decryption (XTS_AES)** [`PDF <{IDF_TARGET_TRM_EN_URL}#extmemencr>`__].
         - 4
       * - ``DIS_DOWNLOAD_MANUAL_ENCRYPT``
         - If set, disables flash encryption when in download bootmodes.
         - 1
       * - ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}``
         - Enables encryption and decryption, when an SPI boot mode is set. Feature is enabled if 1 or 3 bits are set in the eFuse, disabled otherwise.
         - 3

.. only:: SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_128 and not SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_256 and not SOC_EFUSE_CONSISTS_OF_ONE_KEY_BLOCK and SOC_KEY_MANAGER_SUPPORTED

    .. list-table:: eFuses Used in Flash Encryption
       :widths: 25 40 10
       :header-rows: 0

       * - **eFuse**
         - **Description**
         - **Bit Depth**
       * - ``BLOCK_KEYN``
         - AES key storage. N is between 0 and 5. When using a Key Manager-based key, this eFuse is not used.
         - 256-bit key block.
       * - ``KEY_PURPOSE_N``
         - Control the purpose of eFuse block ``BLOCK_KEYN``, where N is between 0 and 5. For flash encryption, the only valid value is ``4`` for ``XTS_AES_128_KEY``. When enabling Flash Encryption using a Key Manager-based key, this eFuse is not used.
         - 4
       * - ``KM_XTS_KEY_LENGTH_256``
         - When enabling Flash Encryption using a Key Manager-based key, this eFuse is used to control the length of the XTS-AES key. Set this eFuse to 1 to use a 128-bit key, and to 0 to use a 256-bit key. This eFuse field is unused when enabling Flash Encryption using an eFuse-based key.
         - 1
       * - ``FORCE_USE_KEY_MANAGER_KEY``
         - When enabling Flash Encryption using a Key Manager-based key, this eFuse is used to force the Key Manager to use the XTS-AES key. Set the bit 1 of this eFuse to use the Key Manager-based key. This eFuse field is unused when enabling Flash Encryption using an eFuse-based key.
         - 1
       * - ``DIS_DOWNLOAD_MANUAL_ENCRYPT``
         - If set, disable flash encryption when in download bootmodes.
         - 1
       * - ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}``
         - Enable encryption and decryption, when an SPI boot mode is set. Feature is enabled if 1 or 3 bits are set in the eFuse, disabled otherwise.
         - 3

.. only:: SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_128 and not SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_256 and not SOC_EFUSE_CONSISTS_OF_ONE_KEY_BLOCK and not SOC_KEY_MANAGER_SUPPORTED

    .. list-table:: eFuses Used in Flash Encryption
       :widths: 25 40 10
       :header-rows: 0

       * - **eFuse**
         - **Description**
         - **Bit Depth**
       * - ``BLOCK_KEYN``
         - AES key storage. N is between 0 and 5.
         - 256-bit key block
       * - ``KEY_PURPOSE_N``
         - Control the purpose of eFuse block ``BLOCK_KEYN``, where N is between 0 and 5. For flash encryption, the only valid value is ``4`` for ``XTS_AES_128_KEY``.
         - 4
       * - ``DIS_DOWNLOAD_MANUAL_ENCRYPT``
         - If set, disable flash encryption when in download bootmodes.
         - 1
       * - ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}``
         - Enable encryption and decryption, when an SPI boot mode is set. Feature is enabled if 1 or 3 bits are set in the eFuse, disabled otherwise.
         - 3

.. only:: SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_128 and SOC_EFUSE_CONSISTS_OF_ONE_KEY_BLOCK

    .. list-table:: eFuses Used in Flash Encryption
       :widths: 25 40 10
       :header-rows: 0

       * - **eFuse**
         - **Description**
         - **Bit Depth**
       * - ``XTS_KEY_LENGTH_256``
         - Controls actual number of eFuse bits used to derive final 256-bit AES key. Possible values: ``1`` use all 256 bits of the eFuse block for the key, ``0`` use the lower 128 bits of the eFuse block for the key (the higher 128 bits are reserved for Secure Boot key). For 128 bits option, the final AES key is derived as SHA256(EFUSE_KEY0_FE_128BIT).
         - 1
       * - ``BLOCK_KEY0``
         - AES key storage
         - 256 or 128 key block
       * - ``DIS_DOWNLOAD_MANUAL_ENCRYPT``
         - If set, disable flash encryption when in download bootmodes.
         - 1
       * - ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}``
         - Enables encryption and decryption, when an SPI boot mode is set. Feature is enabled if 1 or 3 bits are set in the eFuse, disabled otherwise.
         - 3

.. note::

  * R/W access control is available for all the eFuse bits listed in the table above.
  * The default value of these bits is 0 after manufacturing.

Read and write access to eFuse bits is controlled by appropriate fields in the registers ``WR_DIS`` and ``RD_DIS``. For more information on {IDF_TARGET_NAME} eFuses, see :doc:`eFuse manager <../api-reference/system/efuse>`. To change protection bits of eFuse field using ``idf.py``, use these two commands: efuse-read-protect and efuse-write-protect (idf.py based aliases of espefuse commands write-protect-efuse and read-protect-efuse). Example ``idf.py efuse-write-protect DISABLE_DL_ENCRYPT``.

.. only:: esp32c2

    .. important::

       {IDF_TARGET_NAME} has only one eFuse key block for both keys: Secure Boot and Flash Encryption. As the eFuse key block can only be burned once, these keys should be burned together at the same time. Please note that "Secure Boot" and "Flash Encryption" can not be enabled separately as subsequent writes to eFuse key block shall return an error.

Flash Encryption Process
------------------------

Assuming that the eFuse values are in their default states and the second stage bootloader is compiled to support flash encryption, the flash encryption process executes as shown below:

.. only:: not SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES

  1. On the first power-on reset, all data in flash is un-encrypted (plaintext). The first stage (ROM) bootloader loads the second stage bootloader.

  2. Second stage bootloader reads the ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` eFuse value (``0b0000000``). Since the value is ``0`` (even number of bits set), it configures and enables the flash encryption block. It also sets the ``FLASH_CRYPT_CONFIG`` eFuse to 0xF. For more information on the flash encryption block, see **{IDF_TARGET_NAME} Technical Reference Manual** > **eFuse Controller (eFuse)** > **Flash Encryption Block** [`PDF <{IDF_TARGET_TRM_EN_URL}#efuse>`__].

  3. Second stage bootloader first checks if a valid key is already present in the eFuse (e.g., burned using espefuse tool), then the process of key generation is skipped and the same key is used for flash encryption process. Otherwise, Second stage bootloader uses RNG (random) module to generate an AES-256 bit key and then writes it into the ``flash_encryption`` eFuse. The key cannot be accessed via software as the write and read protection bits for the ``flash_encryption`` eFuse are set. The flash encryption operations happen entirely by hardware, and the key cannot be accessed via software.

  4. Flash encryption block encrypts the flash contents - the second stage bootloader, applications and partitions marked as ``encrypted``. Encrypting in-place can take time, up to a minute for large partitions.

  5. Second stage bootloader sets the first available bit in ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` (0b0000001) to mark the flash contents as encrypted. Odd number of bits is set.

  6. For :ref:`flash-enc-development-mode`, the second stage bootloader sets only the eFuse bits ``DISABLE_DL_DECRYPT`` and ``DISABLE_DL_CACHE`` to allow the UART bootloader to re-flash encrypted binaries. Also, the ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` eFuse bits are NOT write-protected.

  7. For :ref:`flash-enc-release-mode`, the second stage bootloader sets the eFuse bits ``DISABLE_DL_ENCRYPT``, ``DISABLE_DL_DECRYPT``, and ``DISABLE_DL_CACHE`` to 1 to prevent the UART bootloader from decrypting the flash contents. It also write-protects the ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` eFuse bits. To modify this behavior, see :ref:`uart-bootloader-encryption`.

  8. The device is then rebooted to start executing the encrypted image. The second stage bootloader calls the flash decryption block to decrypt the flash contents and then loads the decrypted contents into IRAM.

.. only:: SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_256 and SOC_KEY_MANAGER_SUPPORTED

  1. On the first power-on reset, all data in flash is un-encrypted (plaintext). The first stage (ROM) bootloader loads the second stage bootloader.

  2. Second stage bootloader reads the ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` eFuse value (``0b000``). Since the value is ``0`` (even number of bits set), it configures and enables the flash encryption block. For more information on the flash encryption block, see **{IDF_TARGET_NAME} Technical Reference Manual** > **eFuse Controller (eFuse)** > **Manual Encryption Block** [`PDF <{IDF_TARGET_TRM_EN_URL}#efuse>`__].

  3. Second stage bootloader first checks if a valid key already exists, to decide whether to skip the key generation step:

    - If Flash Encryption is intended to be enabled using an eFuse-based key, it checks if a valid key is already present in the eFuse (e.g., burned using espefuse tool).
    - If Flash Encryption is intended to be enabled using a Key Manager-based key, it checks if there exists a valid key recovery info in the flash memory at the addresses: 0x0 and 0x1000.

    If the check passes, the process of key generation is skipped and the same key is used for the flash encryption process.

  4. Otherwise, if using an eFuse-based key, second stage bootloader uses RNG (random) module to generate an 256-bit or 512-bit key, depending on the value of :ref:`Size of generated XTS-AES key <CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_KEYSIZE>`, and then writes it into respectively one or two ``BLOCK_KEYN`` eFuses. The software also updates the ``KEY_PURPOSE_N`` for the blocks where the keys were stored. The key cannot be accessed via software as the write and read protection bits for one or two ``BLOCK_KEYN`` eFuses are set. ``KEY_PURPOSE_N`` field is write-protected as well. Whereas if using a Key Manager-based key, second stage bootloader writes the key recovery info to the flash memory at the address 0x0, followed by programming the ``KM_XTS_KEY_LENGTH_256`` and the ``FORCE_USE_KEY_MANAGER_KEY`` eFuses. The flash encryption operations happen entirely by hardware, and the key cannot be accessed via software.

  5. Flash encryption block encrypts the flash contents – the second stage bootloader, applications and partitions marked as ``encrypted``. Encrypting in-place can take time, up to a minute for large partitions.

  6. Second stage bootloader sets the first available bit in ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` (0b001) to mark the flash contents as encrypted. Odd number of bits is set.

  7. For :ref:`flash-enc-development-mode`, the second stage bootloader allows the UART bootloader to re-flash encrypted binaries. Also, the ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` eFuse bits are NOT write-protected. In addition, the second stage bootloader by default sets the following eFuse bits:

    .. list::

      :esp32s2: - ``DIS_BOOT_REMAP``
      - ``DIS_DOWNLOAD_ICACHE``
      - ``DIS_DOWNLOAD_DCACHE``
      - ``HARD_DIS_JTAG``
      - ``DIS_LEGACY_SPI_BOOT``

  8. For :ref:`flash-enc-release-mode`, the second stage bootloader sets all the eFuse bits set under development mode as well as ``DIS_DOWNLOAD_MANUAL_ENCRYPT``. It also write-protects the ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` eFuse bits. To modify this behavior, see :ref:`uart-bootloader-encryption`.

  9. The device is then rebooted to start executing the encrypted image. The second stage bootloader calls the flash decryption block to decrypt the flash contents and then loads the decrypted contents into IRAM.

.. only:: SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_256 and not SOC_KEY_MANAGER_SUPPORTED

  1. On the first power-on reset, all data in flash is un-encrypted (plaintext). The first stage (ROM) bootloader loads the second stage bootloader.

  2. Second stage bootloader reads the ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` eFuse value (``0b000``). Since the value is ``0`` (even number of bits set), it configures and enables the flash encryption block. For more information on the flash encryption block, see **{IDF_TARGET_NAME} Technical Reference Manual** > **eFuse Controller (eFuse)** > **Auto Encryption Block** [`PDF <{IDF_TARGET_TRM_EN_URL}#efuse>`__].

  3. Second stage bootloader first checks if a valid key is already present in the eFuse (e.g., burned using espefuse tool) then the process of key generation is skipped and the same key is used for flash encryption process. Otherwise, second stage bootloader uses RNG (random) module to generate a 256-bit or 512-bit key, depending on the value of :ref:`Size of generated XTS-AES key <CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_KEYSIZE>`, and then writes it into respectively one or two ``BLOCK_KEYN`` eFuses. The software also updates the ``KEY_PURPOSE_N`` for the blocks where the keys were stored. The key cannot be accessed via software as the write and read protection bits for one or two `BLOCK_KEYN` eFuses are set. ``KEY_PURPOSE_N`` field is write-protected as well. The flash encryption operations happen entirely by hardware, and the key cannot be accessed via software.

  4. Flash encryption block encrypts the flash contents - the second stage bootloader, applications and partitions marked as ``encrypted``. Encrypting in-place can take time, up to a minute for large partitions.

  5. Second stage bootloader sets the first available bit in ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` (0b001) to mark the flash contents as encrypted. Odd number of bits is set.

  6. For :ref:`flash-enc-development-mode`, the second stage bootloader allows the UART bootloader to re-flash encrypted binaries. Also, the ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` eFuse bits are NOT write-protected. In addition, the second stage bootloader by default sets the following eFuse bits:

    .. list::

      :esp32s2: - ``DIS_BOOT_REMAP``
      - ``DIS_DOWNLOAD_ICACHE``
      - ``DIS_DOWNLOAD_DCACHE``
      - ``HARD_DIS_JTAG``
      - ``DIS_LEGACY_SPI_BOOT``

  7. For :ref:`flash-enc-release-mode`, the second stage bootloader sets all the eFuse bits set under development mode as well as ``DIS_DOWNLOAD_MANUAL_ENCRYPT``. It also write-protects the ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` eFuse bits. To modify this behavior, see :ref:`uart-bootloader-encryption`.

  8. The device is then rebooted to start executing the encrypted image. The second stage bootloader calls the flash decryption block to decrypt the flash contents and then loads the decrypted contents into IRAM.

.. only:: SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_128 and not SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_256 and not SOC_EFUSE_CONSISTS_OF_ONE_KEY_BLOCK and SOC_KEY_MANAGER_SUPPORTED

  1. On the first power-on reset, all data in flash is un-encrypted (plaintext). The first stage (ROM) bootloader loads the second stage bootloader.

  2. Second stage bootloader reads the ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` eFuse value (``0b000``). Since the value is ``0`` (even number of bits set), it configures and enables the flash encryption block. For more information on the flash encryption block, see `{IDF_TARGET_NAME} Technical Reference Manual <{IDF_TARGET_TRM_EN_URL}>`_.

  3. Second stage bootloader first checks if a valid key already exists, to decide whether to skip the key generation step:

    - If Flash Encryption is intended to be enabled using an eFuse-based key, it checks if a valid key is already present in the eFuse (e.g., burned using espefuse tool).
    - If Flash Encryption is intended to be enabled using a Key Manager-based key, it checks if there exists a valid key recovery info in the flash memory at the addresses: 0x0 and 0x1000.

    If the check passes, the process of key generation is skipped and the same key is used for the flash encryption process.

  4. Otherwise, if using an eFuse-based key second stage bootloader uses RNG (random) module to generate a 256-bit key, and then writes it into respectively one ``BLOCK_KEYN`` eFuse block. The software also updates the ``KEY_PURPOSE_N`` for the block where the key were stored. The key cannot be accessed via software as the write and read protection bits for the ``BLOCK_KEYN`` eFuse block is set. ``KEY_PURPOSE_N`` field is write-protected as well. Whereas if using a Key Manager-based key, second stage bootloader writes the key recovery info to the flash memory at the address 0x0, followed by programming the ``KM_XTS_KEY_LENGTH_256`` and the ``FORCE_USE_KEY_MANAGER_KEY`` eFuses. The flash encryption operations happen entirely by hardware, and the key cannot be accessed via software.

  5. Flash encryption block encrypts the flash contents - the second stage bootloader, applications and partitions marked as ``encrypted``. Encrypting in-place can take time, up to a minute for large partitions.

  6. Second stage bootloader sets the first available bit in ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` (0b001) to mark the flash contents as encrypted. Odd number of bits is set.

  7. For :ref:`flash-enc-development-mode`, the second stage bootloader allows the UART bootloader to re-flash encrypted binaries. Also, the ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` eFuse bits are NOT write-protected. In addition, the second stage bootloader by default sets the eFuse bits ``DIS_DOWNLOAD_ICACHE``, ``DIS_PAD_JTAG``, ``DIS_USB_JTAG`` and ``DIS_LEGACY_SPI_BOOT``.

  8. For :ref:`flash-enc-release-mode`, the second stage bootloader sets all the eFuse bits set under development mode as well as ``DIS_DOWNLOAD_MANUAL_ENCRYPT``. It also write-protects the ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` eFuse bits. To modify this behavior, see :ref:`uart-bootloader-encryption`.

  9. The device is then rebooted to start executing the encrypted image. The second stage bootloader calls the flash decryption block to decrypt the flash contents and then loads the decrypted contents into IRAM.

.. only:: SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_128 and not SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_256 and not SOC_EFUSE_CONSISTS_OF_ONE_KEY_BLOCK

  1. On the first power-on reset, all data in flash is un-encrypted (plaintext). The first stage (ROM) bootloader loads the second stage bootloader.

  2. Second stage bootloader reads the ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` eFuse value (``0b000``). Since the value is ``0`` (even number of bits set), it configures and enables the flash encryption block. For more information on the flash encryption block, see `{IDF_TARGET_NAME} Technical Reference Manual <{IDF_TARGET_TRM_EN_URL}>`_.

  3. Second stage bootloader first checks if a valid key is already present in the eFuse (e.g., burned using espefuse tool), then the process of key generation is skipped and the same key is used for flash encryption process.

  4. Otherwise, second stage bootloader uses RNG (random) module to generate a 256-bit key and then writes it into ``BLOCK_KEYN`` eFuse. The software also updates the ``KEY_PURPOSE_N`` for the block where the key is stored. The key cannot be accessed via software as the write and read protection bits for ``BLOCK_KEYN`` eFuse are set. ``KEY_PURPOSE_N`` field is write-protected as well. The flash encryption is completely conducted by hardware, and the key cannot be accessed via software.

  5. Flash encryption block encrypts the flash contents - the second stage bootloader, applications and partitions marked as ``encrypted``. Encrypting in-place can take time, up to a minute for large partitions.

  6. Second stage bootloader sets the first available bit in ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` (0b001) to mark the flash contents as encrypted. Odd number of bits is set.

  7. For :ref:`flash-enc-development-mode`, the second stage bootloader allows the UART bootloader to re-flash encrypted binaries. Also, the ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` eFuse bits are NOT write-protected. In addition, the second stage bootloader by default sets the eFuse bits ``DIS_DOWNLOAD_ICACHE``, ``DIS_PAD_JTAG``, ``DIS_USB_JTAG`` and ``DIS_LEGACY_SPI_BOOT``.

  8. For :ref:`flash-enc-release-mode`, the second stage bootloader sets all the eFuse bits set under development mode as well as ``DIS_DOWNLOAD_MANUAL_ENCRYPT``. It also write-protects the ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` eFuse bits. To modify this behavior, see :ref:`uart-bootloader-encryption`.

  9. The device is then rebooted to start executing the encrypted image. The second stage bootloader calls the flash decryption block to decrypt the flash contents and then loads the decrypted contents into IRAM.

.. only:: SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_128 and SOC_EFUSE_CONSISTS_OF_ONE_KEY_BLOCK

  1. On the first power-on reset, all data in flash is un-encrypted (plaintext). The first stage (ROM) bootloader loads the second stage bootloader.

  2. The second stage bootloader reads the ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` eFuse value (``0b000``). Since the value is ``0`` (even number of bits set), it configures and enables the flash encryption block. For more information on the flash encryption block, see `{IDF_TARGET_NAME} Technical Reference Manual <{IDF_TARGET_TRM_EN_URL}>`_.

  3. The second stage bootloader uses RNG (random) module to generate an 256 or 128 bit key (depends on :ref:`Size of generated XTS-AES key <CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_KEYSIZE>`) and then writes it into `BLOCK_KEY0` eFuse. The software also updates the ``XTS_KEY_LENGTH_256`` according to the chosen option. The key cannot be accessed via software as the write and read protection bits for ``BLOCK_KEY0`` eFuse are set. The flash encryption operations happen entirely by hardware, and the key cannot be accessed via software. If 128-bit flash encryption key is used, then only the lower 128 bits of the eFuse key block are read-protected, the remaining 128 bits are readable, which is required for secure boot. The entire eFuse block is write-protected. If the FE key is 256 bits long, then ``XTS_KEY_LENGTH_256`` is 1, otherwise it is 0. To prevent this eFuse from being accidentally changed in the future (from 0 to 1), we set a write-protect bit for the release mode. If a valid key is already present in the eFuse (e.g., burned using espefuse tool) then the process of key generation is skipped and the same key is used for flash encryption process.

  4. Flash encryption block encrypts the flash contents - the second stage bootloader, applications and partitions marked as ``encrypted``. Encrypting in-place can take time, up to a minute for large partitions.

  5. The second stage bootloader sets the first available bit in ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` (0b001) to mark the flash contents as encrypted. Odd number of bits is set.

  6. For :ref:`flash-enc-development-mode`, the second stage bootloader allows the UART bootloader to re-flash encrypted binaries. Also, the ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` eFuse bits are NOT write-protected. In addition, the second stage bootloader by default sets the eFuse bits ``DIS_DOWNLOAD_ICACHE``, ``DIS_PAD_JTAG``, and ``DIS_DIRECT_BOOT``.

  7. For :ref:`flash-enc-release-mode`, the second stage bootloader sets all the eFuse bits set under development mode as well as ``DIS_DOWNLOAD_MANUAL_ENCRYPT``. It also write-protects the ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` eFuse bits. To modify this behavior, see :ref:`uart-bootloader-encryption`.

  8. The device is then rebooted to start executing the encrypted image. The second stage bootloader calls the flash decryption block to decrypt the flash contents and then loads the decrypted contents into IRAM.

During the development stage, there is a frequent need to program different plaintext flash images and test the flash encryption process. This requires that Firmware Download mode is able to load new plaintext images as many times as it might be needed. However, during manufacturing or production stages, Firmware Download mode should not be allowed to access flash contents for security reasons.

Hence, two different flash encryption configurations were created: for development and for production. For details on these configurations, see Section `Flash Encryption Configuration`_.



Flash Encryption Configuration
------------------------------

The following flash encryption modes are available:

- :ref:`flash-enc-development-mode` - recommended for use only during development. In this mode, it is still possible to flash new plaintext firmware to the device, and the bootloader will transparently encrypt this firmware using the key stored in hardware. This allows, indirectly, to read out the plaintext of the firmware in flash.
- :ref:`flash-enc-release-mode` - recommended for manufacturing and production. In this mode, flashing plaintext firmware to the device without knowing the encryption key is no longer possible.

This section provides information on the mentioned flash encryption modes and step by step instructions on how to use them.

.. _flash-enc-development-mode:

Development Mode
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

During development, you can encrypt flash using either an {IDF_TARGET_NAME} generated key or external host-generated key.


Using {IDF_TARGET_NAME} Generated Key
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

Development mode allows you to download multiple plaintext images using Firmware Download mode.

To test flash encryption process, take the following steps:

1. Ensure that you have an {IDF_TARGET_NAME} device with default flash encryption eFuse settings as shown in :ref:`flash-encryption-efuse`.

  See how to check :ref:`flash-encryption-status`.

2. In :ref:`project-configuration-menu`, do the following:

  .. list::

    - :ref:`Enable flash encryption on boot <CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENC_ENABLED>`.
    - :ref:`Select encryption mode <CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_MODE>` (**development mode** by default).
    :esp32: - :ref:`Select UART ROM download mode <CONFIG_SECURE_UART_ROM_DL_MODE>` (**enabled** by default). Note that for the ESP32 target, the choice is only available when :ref:`CONFIG_ESP32_REV_MIN` level is set to 3 (ESP32 V3).
    :not esp32: - :ref:`Select UART ROM download mode <CONFIG_SECURE_UART_ROM_DL_MODE>` (**enabled** by default).
    :SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_OPTIONS: - Set :ref:`Size of generated XTS-AES key <CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_KEYSIZE>`.
    :SOC_KEY_MANAGER_SUPPORTED: - :ref:`Select the key source for the Flash Encryption key <CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SOURCE>`.
    - :ref:`Select the appropriate bootloader log verbosity <CONFIG_BOOTLOADER_LOG_LEVEL>`.
    - Save the configuration and exit.

  Enabling flash encryption will increase the size of bootloader, which might require updating partition table offset. See :ref:`bootloader-size`.

3. Run the command given below to build and flash the complete images.

  .. code-block:: bash

      idf.py flash monitor

  .. note::

      This command does not include any user files which should be written to the partitions on the flash memory. Please write them manually before running this command otherwise the files should be encrypted separately before writing.

  This command will write to flash memory unencrypted images: the second stage bootloader, the partition table and applications. Once the flashing is complete, {IDF_TARGET_NAME} will reset. On the next boot, the second stage bootloader encrypts: the second stage bootloader, application partitions and partitions marked as ``encrypted`` then resets. Encrypting in-place can take time, up to a minute for large partitions. After that, the application is decrypted at runtime and executed.

.. only:: SOC_KEY_MANAGER_FE_KEY_DEPLOY

  A sample output of the first {IDF_TARGET_NAME} boot after enabling flash encryption using a Key Manager-based key is given below:

  .. include:: {IDF_TARGET_PATH_NAME}_log.inc
    :start-after: first_boot_enc_km
    :end-before: ------

  A sample output of subsequent {IDF_TARGET_NAME} boot mentions that Flash Encryption is already enabled (ESP-ROM log mentions that the Key Manager-based key is being used):

  .. include:: {IDF_TARGET_PATH_NAME}_log.inc
    :start-after: already_en_enc_km
    :end-before: ------

A sample output of the first {IDF_TARGET_NAME} boot after enabling flash encryption using an eFuse-based key is given below:

.. include:: {IDF_TARGET_PATH_NAME}_log.inc
   :start-after: first_boot_enc
   :end-before: ------

A sample output of subsequent {IDF_TARGET_NAME} boot mentions that Flash Encryption is already enabled:

.. include:: {IDF_TARGET_PATH_NAME}_log.inc
   :start-after: already_en_enc
   :end-before: ------

At this stage, if you need to update and re-flash binaries, see :ref:`encrypt-partitions`.


.. _pregenerated-flash-encryption-key:

Using Host Generated Key
""""""""""""""""""""""""

It is possible to pre-generate a flash encryption key on the host computer and program it into the device. This allows you to pre-encrypt data on the host and flash already encrypted data without needing a plaintext flash update. This feature can be used in both :ref:`flash-enc-development-mode` and :ref:`flash-enc-release-mode`. Without a pre-generated key, data is flashed in plaintext and then {IDF_TARGET_NAME} encrypts the data in-place.

.. note::

    This option is not recommended for production, unless a separate key is generated for each individual device.

.. only:: esp32c2

    .. note::

       Note that {IDF_TARGET_NAME} only has one eFuse key block for both Secure Boot and Flash Encryption keys. Therefore, writing the host-generated Flash Encryption key must be done with Secure Boot key (if used), otherwise Secure Boot cannot be used.

To use a host generated key and program it into the eFuses of the device, take the following steps:

1. Ensure that you have an {IDF_TARGET_NAME} device with default flash encryption eFuse settings as shown in :ref:`flash-encryption-efuse`.

  See how to check :ref:`flash-encryption-status`.

2. Generate a random key by running:

  .. only:: not SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES

      .. code-block:: bash

          idf.py secure-generate-flash-encryption-key my_flash_encryption_key.bin

  .. only:: SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_256

      If :ref:`Size of generated XTS-AES key <CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_KEYSIZE>` is AES-128 (256-bit key):

      .. code-block:: bash

          idf.py secure-generate-flash-encryption-key my_flash_encryption_key.bin

      else if :ref:`Size of generated XTS-AES key <CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_KEYSIZE>` is AES-256 (512-bit key):

      .. code-block:: bash

          idf.py secure-generate-flash-encryption-key --keylen 512 my_flash_encryption_key.bin


  .. only:: SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_128 and not SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_256 and not SOC_EFUSE_CONSISTS_OF_ONE_KEY_BLOCK

      .. code-block:: bash

          idf.py secure-generate-flash-encryption-key my_flash_encryption_key.bin

.. only:: SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_128 and SOC_EFUSE_CONSISTS_OF_ONE_KEY_BLOCK

      If :ref:`Size of generated XTS-AES key <CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_KEYSIZE>` is AES-128 (256-bit key):

      .. code-block:: bash

          idf.py secure-generate-flash-encryption-key my_flash_encryption_key.bin

      else if :ref:`Size of generated XTS-AES key <CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_KEYSIZE>` is AES-128 key derived from 128 bits (SHA256(128 bits)):

      .. code-block:: bash

          idf.py secure-generate-flash-encryption-key --keylen 128 my_flash_encryption_key.bin

3. **Before the first encrypted boot**, burn the key into your device's eFuse using the command below. This action can be done **only once**.

  .. only:: not SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES

    .. code-block:: bash

        idf.py --port PORT efuse-burn-key flash_encryption my_flash_encryption_key.bin

  .. only:: SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_256

    .. code-block:: bash

        idf.py --port PORT efuse-burn-key BLOCK my_flash_encryption_key.bin KEYPURPOSE

    where ``BLOCK`` is a free keyblock between ``BLOCK_KEY0`` and ``BLOCK_KEY5``. And ``KEYPURPOSE`` is either ``XTS_AES_256_KEY_1``, ``XTS_AES_256_KEY_2``, ``XTS_AES_128_KEY``. See `{IDF_TARGET_NAME} Technical Reference Manual <{IDF_TARGET_TRM_EN_URL}>`_ for a description of the key purposes.

    For AES-128 (256-bit key) - ``XTS_AES_128_KEY``:

    .. code-block:: bash

        idf.py --port PORT efuse-burn-key BLOCK my_flash_encryption_key.bin XTS_AES_128_KEY

    For AES-256 (512-bit key) - ``XTS_AES_256_KEY_1`` and ``XTS_AES_256_KEY_2``. ``idf.py`` supports burning both these two key purposes together with a 512 bit key to two separate key blocks via the virtual key purpose ``XTS_AES_256_KEY``. When this is used ``idf.py`` will burn the first 256 bits of the key to the specified ``BLOCK`` and burn the corresponding block key purpose to ``XTS_AES_256_KEY_1``. The last 256 bits of the key will be burned to the first free key block after ``BLOCK`` and the corresponding block key purpose to ``XTS_AES_256_KEY_2``

    .. code-block:: bash

        idf.py --port PORT efuse-burn-key BLOCK my_flash_encryption_key.bin XTS_AES_256_KEY

    If you wish to specify exactly which two blocks are used then it is possible to divide key into two 256-bit keys, and manually burn each half with ``XTS_AES_256_KEY_1`` and ``XTS_AES_256_KEY_2`` as key purposes:

    .. code-block:: bash

      split -b 32 my_flash_encryption_key.bin my_flash_encryption_key.bin.
      idf.py --port PORT efuse-burn-key BLOCK my_flash_encryption_key.bin.aa XTS_AES_256_KEY_1
      idf.py --port PORT efuse-burn-key BLOCK+1 my_flash_encryption_key.bin.ab XTS_AES_256_KEY_2


  .. only:: SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_128 and not SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_256 and not SOC_EFUSE_CONSISTS_OF_ONE_KEY_BLOCK

    .. code-block:: bash

        idf.py --port PORT efuse-burn-key BLOCK my_flash_encryption_key.bin XTS_AES_128_KEY

    where ``BLOCK`` is a free keyblock between ``BLOCK_KEY0`` and ``BLOCK_KEY5``.

  .. only:: SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_128 and SOC_EFUSE_CONSISTS_OF_ONE_KEY_BLOCK

    For AES-128 (256-bit key) - ``XTS_AES_128_KEY`` (the ``XTS_KEY_LENGTH_256`` eFuse will be burn to 1):

    .. code-block:: bash

        idf.py --port PORT efuse-burn-key BLOCK_KEY0 flash_encryption_key256.bin XTS_AES_128_KEY

    For AES-128 key derived from 128 bits (SHA256(128 bits)) - ``XTS_AES_128_KEY_DERIVED_FROM_128_EFUSE_BITS``. The FE key will be written in the lower part of eFuse BLOCK_KEY0. The upper 128 bits are not used and will remain available for reading by software. Using the special mode of the espefuse tool, shown in the ``For burning both keys together`` section below, the user can write their data to it using any espefuse commands.

    .. code-block:: bash

        idf.py --port PORT efuse-burn-key BLOCK_KEY0 flash_encryption_key128.bin XTS_AES_128_KEY_DERIVED_FROM_128_EFUSE_BITS

    For burning both keys together (Secure Boot and Flash Encryption):

    .. code-block:: bash

        espefuse --port PORT --chip esp32c2 burn-key-digest secure_boot_signing_key.pem \
                                            burn-key BLOCK_KEY0 flash_encryption_key128.bin XTS_AES_128_KEY_DERIVED_FROM_128_EFUSE_BITS

  If the key is not burned and the device is started after enabling flash encryption, the {IDF_TARGET_NAME} will generate a random key that software cannot access or modify.

4. In :ref:`project-configuration-menu`, do the following:

   - :ref:`Enable flash encryption on boot <CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENC_ENABLED>`
   - :ref:`Select encryption mode <CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_MODE>` (**development mode** by default)
   - :ref:`Select the appropriate bootloader log verbosity <CONFIG_BOOTLOADER_LOG_LEVEL>`
   - Save the configuration and exit.

  Enabling flash encryption will increase the size of bootloader, which might require updating partition table offset. See :ref:`bootloader-size`.

5. Run the command given below to build and flash the complete images.

  .. code-block:: bash

      idf.py flash monitor

  .. note::

      This command does not include any user files which should be written to the partitions on the flash memory. Please write them manually before running this command otherwise the files should be encrypted separately before writing.

  This command will write to flash memory unencrypted images: the second stage bootloader, the partition table and applications. Once the flashing is complete, {IDF_TARGET_NAME} will reset. On the next boot, the second stage bootloader encrypts: the second stage bootloader, application partitions and partitions marked as ``encrypted`` then resets. Encrypting in-place can take time, up to a minute for large partitions. After that, the application is decrypted at runtime and executed.

.. only:: SOC_KEY_MANAGER_SUPPORTED

  To use a host generated key and deploy it into the device's Key Manager, take the following steps:

  1. Ensure that you have an {IDF_TARGET_NAME} device with default flash encryption eFuse settings as shown in :ref:`flash-encryption-efuse`.

    See how to check :ref:`flash-encryption-status`.

  2. Generate a random key by running:

    .. only:: SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_256

        If :ref:`Size of generated XTS-AES key <CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_KEYSIZE>` is AES-128 (256-bit key):

        .. code-block:: bash

            idf.py secure-generate-flash-encryption-key my_flash_encryption_key.bin

        else if :ref:`Size of generated XTS-AES key <CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_KEYSIZE>` is AES-256 (512-bit key):

        .. code-block:: bash

            idf.py secure-generate-flash-encryption-key --keylen 512 my_flash_encryption_key.bin


    .. only:: SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_128 and not SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_256 and not SOC_EFUSE_CONSISTS_OF_ONE_KEY_BLOCK

        .. code-block:: bash

            idf.py secure-generate-flash-encryption-key my_flash_encryption_key.bin


  3. **Before the first encrypted boot**, deploy the key into your device's Key Manager via its AES-deploy mode, using an init key and an auxiliary key.

  4. The deployment process will generate key recovery information for the deployed key. Store the information at the flash address 0x0 using the following command:

    .. code-block:: bash

        esptool --port PORT --baud BAUD write-flash 0x0 key_recovery_info.bin

    If the key is not deployed and the device is started after enabling Flash Encryption, the {IDF_TARGET_NAME} will generate and deploy a random key that software cannot access or modify.

    .. note::

        This command does not include any user files which should be written to the partitions on the flash memory. Please write them manually before running this command. Otherwise, the files should be encrypted separately before writing.

  5. In :ref:`project-configuration-menu`, do the following:

     - :ref:`Enable Flash Encryption on boot <CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENC_ENABLED>`
     - :ref:`Select encryption mode <CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_MODE>` (**development mode** by default)
     - :ref:`Select Flash Encryption key source as the Key Manager <CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SOURCE>`
     - :ref:`Select the appropriate bootloader log verbosity <CONFIG_BOOTLOADER_LOG_LEVEL>`
     - Save the configuration and exit.

    Enabling flash encryption will increase the size of bootloader, which might require updating partition table offset. See :ref:`bootloader-size`.

  6. Run the command given below to build and flash the complete images.

    .. code-block:: bash

        idf.py flash monitor

    .. note::

        This command does not include any user files which should be written to the partitions on the flash memory. Please write them manually before running this command. Otherwise, the files should be encrypted separately before writing.

If using development mode, then the easiest way to update and re-flash binaries is :ref:`encrypt-partitions`.

If using release mode, then it is possible to pre-encrypt the binaries on the host and then flash them as ciphertext. See :ref:`manual-encryption`.


.. _encrypt-partitions:

Re-flashing Updated Partitions
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

If you update your application code (done in plaintext) and want to re-flash it, you will need to encrypt it before flashing. To encrypt the application and flash it in one step, run:

.. code-block:: bash

    idf.py encrypted-app-flash monitor

If all partitions need to be updated in encrypted format, run:

.. code-block:: bash

    idf.py encrypted-flash monitor

.. note::

    The above operations are only applicable when the ``DIS_DOWNLOAD_MANUAL_ENCRYPT`` eFuse bit has not been programmed. If this eFuse bit has been programmed, you must flash the pre-encrypted ciphertext image instead.

.. _flash-enc-release-mode:

Release Mode
^^^^^^^^^^^^

In release mode, UART bootloader cannot perform flash encryption operations. New plaintext images can ONLY be downloaded using the over-the-air (OTA) scheme which will encrypt the plaintext image before writing to flash.

If you already enabled flash encryption in Development mode and want to switch to Release mode, see :ref:`flash-enc-transition-dev-to-release`.

To use this mode (first-time enable with Release selected), take the following steps:

1. Ensure that you have an {IDF_TARGET_NAME} device with default flash encryption eFuse settings as shown in :ref:`flash-encryption-efuse`.

  See how to check :ref:`flash-encryption-status`.

2. In :ref:`project-configuration-menu`, do the following:

  .. list::

    - :ref:`Enable Flash Encryption on boot <CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENC_ENABLED>`.
    :esp32: - :ref:`Select release mode <CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_MODE>`. (Note that once release mode is selected, the ``DISABLE_DL_ENCRYPT`` and ``DISABLE_DL_DECRYPT`` eFuse bits will be burned to disable flash encryption hardware in ROM Download Mode.)
    :esp32: - :ref:`Select UART ROM download mode (Permanently disabled (recommended)) <CONFIG_SECURE_UART_ROM_DL_MODE>` (Note that this option is only available when :ref:`CONFIG_ESP32_REV_MIN` is set to 3 (ESP32 V3).) The default choice is to keep UART ROM download mode enabled, however it is recommended to permanently disable this mode to reduce the options available to an attacker.
    :not esp32: - :ref:`Select release mode <CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_MODE>`. (Note that once release mode is selected, the ``EFUSE_DIS_DOWNLOAD_MANUAL_ENCRYPT`` eFuse bit will be burned to disable flash encryption hardware in ROM Download Mode.)
    :not esp32: - :ref:`Select UART ROM download mode (Permanently switch to Secure mode (recommended)) <CONFIG_SECURE_UART_ROM_DL_MODE>`. This is the default option, and is recommended. It is also possible to change this configuration setting to permanently disable UART ROM download mode, if this mode is not needed.
    :SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_SUPPORT_PSEUDO_ROUND: - :ref:`Select enable XTS-AES's pseudo rounds function <CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_PSEUDO_ROUND_FUNC>`. This option is selected by default and its strength is configured to level low considering the performance impact on the flash encryption/decryption operations. Please refer to :ref:`xts-aes-pseudo-round-func` for more information regarding the performance impact per security level.
    - :ref:`Select the appropriate bootloader log verbosity <CONFIG_BOOTLOADER_LOG_LEVEL>`.
    - Save the configuration and exit.

    Enabling flash encryption will increase the size of bootloader, which might require updating partition table offset. See :ref:`bootloader-size`.

3. Run the command given below to build and flash the complete images.

  .. code-block:: bash

      idf.py flash monitor


  .. note::

      This command does not include any user files which should be written to the partitions on the flash memory. Please write them manually before running this command otherwise the files should be encrypted separately before writing.

  This command will write to flash memory unencrypted images: the second stage bootloader, the partition table and applications. Once the flashing is complete, {IDF_TARGET_NAME} will reset. On the next boot, the second stage bootloader encrypts: the second stage bootloader, application partitions and partitions marked as ``encrypted`` then resets. Encrypting in-place can take time, up to a minute for large partitions. After that, the application is decrypted at runtime and executed.

Once the flash encryption is enabled in release mode, the bootloader will write-protect the ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` eFuse.

For subsequent plaintext field updates, use :ref:`OTA scheme <updating-encrypted-flash-ota>`.

.. note::

    If you have pre-generated the flash encryption key and stored a copy, and the UART download mode is not permanently disabled via :ref:`CONFIG_SECURE_UART_ROM_DL_MODE` {IDF_TARGET_ESP32_V3_ONLY}, then it is possible to update the flash locally by pre-encrypting the files and then flashing the ciphertext. See :ref:`manual-encryption`.

.. _flash-enc-transition-dev-to-release:

Transitioning from Development to Release Mode
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

If flash encryption was enabled in :ref:`flash-enc-development-mode`, the device remains in Development mode until the corresponding release eFuses are burned. Selecting **Release mode** in menuconfig (:ref:`CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_MODE`) only updates the build configuration; it does **not** burn the eFuses.
To permanently transition the device to Release mode, you must explicitly call :cpp:func:`esp_flash_encryption_set_release_mode` once in your application code to burn the relevant eFuses.

.. code-block:: c

    #include "esp_flash_encrypt.h"

    if (!esp_flash_encryption_cfg_verify_release_mode()) {
        esp_flash_encryption_set_release_mode();
    }

Alternatively, refer the :example:`security/security_features_app` example, which implements this logic.

.. _flash-encrypt-best-practices:

Best Practices
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

When using Flash Encryption in production:

.. list::

   - Do not reuse the same flash encryption key between multiple devices. This means that an attacker who copies encrypted data from one device cannot transfer it to a second device.
   :esp32: - When using ESP32 V3, if the UART ROM Download Mode is not needed for a production device then it should be disabled to provide an extra level of protection. Do this by calling :cpp:func:`esp_efuse_disable_rom_download_mode` during application startup. Alternatively, configure the project :ref:`CONFIG_ESP32_REV_MIN` level to 3 (targeting ESP32 V3 only) and select the :ref:`CONFIG_SECURE_UART_ROM_DL_MODE` to "Permanently disable ROM Download Mode (recommended)". The ability to disable ROM Download Mode is not available on earlier ESP32 versions.
   :not esp32: - The UART ROM Download Mode should be disabled entirely if it is not needed, or permanently set to "Secure Download Mode" otherwise. Secure Download Mode permanently limits the available commands to updating SPI config, changing baud rate, basic flash write, and returning a summary of the currently enabled security features with the `get-security-info` command. The default behaviour is to set Secure Download Mode on first boot in release mode. To disable Download Mode entirely, select :ref:`CONFIG_SECURE_UART_ROM_DL_MODE` to "Permanently disable ROM Download Mode (recommended)" or call :cpp:func:`esp_efuse_disable_rom_download_mode` at runtime.
   - Enable :doc:`Secure Boot <secure-boot-v2>` as an extra layer of protection, and to prevent an attacker from selectively corrupting any part of the flash before boot.

Enable Flash Encryption Externally
----------------------------------

In the process mentioned above, flash encryption related eFuses which ultimately enable flash encryption are programmed through the second stage bootloader. Alternatively, all the eFuses can be programmed with the help of ``espefuse`` tool. Please refer :ref:`enable-flash-encryption-externally` for more details.

Possible Failures
-----------------

Once flash encryption is enabled, the ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` eFuse value will have an odd number of bits set. It means that all the partitions marked with the encryption flag are expected to contain encrypted ciphertext. Below are the three typical failure cases if the {IDF_TARGET_NAME} is erroneously loaded with plaintext data:

1. If the bootloader partition is re-flashed with a **plaintext second stage bootloader image**, the first stage (ROM) bootloader will fail to load the second stage bootloader resulting in the following failure:

  .. only:: esp32

    .. code-block:: bash

        rst:0x3 (SW_RESET),boot:0x13 (SPI_FAST_FLASH_BOOT)
        flash read err, 1000
        ets_main.c 371
        ets Jun  8 2016 00:22:57

        rst:0x7 (TG0WDT_SYS_RESET),boot:0x13 (SPI_FAST_FLASH_BOOT)
        flash read err, 1000
        ets_main.c 371
        ets Jun  8 2016 00:22:57

        rst:0x7 (TG0WDT_SYS_RESET),boot:0x13 (SPI_FAST_FLASH_BOOT)
        flash read err, 1000
        ets_main.c 371
        ets Jun  8 2016 00:22:57

        rst:0x7 (TG0WDT_SYS_RESET),boot:0x13 (SPI_FAST_FLASH_BOOT)
        flash read err, 1000
        ets_main.c 371
        ets Jun  8 2016 00:22:57

        rst:0x7 (TG0WDT_SYS_RESET),boot:0x13 (SPI_FAST_FLASH_BOOT)
        flash read err, 1000
        ets_main.c 371
        ets Jun  8 2016 00:22:57

  .. only:: not esp32

    .. code-block:: bash

        rst:0x3 (SW_RESET),boot:0x13 (SPI_FAST_FLASH_BOOT)
        invalid header: 0xb414f76b
        invalid header: 0xb414f76b
        invalid header: 0xb414f76b
        invalid header: 0xb414f76b
        invalid header: 0xb414f76b
        invalid header: 0xb414f76b
        invalid header: 0xb414f76b

    .. note::

      The value of invalid header will be different for every application.

    .. note::

      This error also appears if the flash contents are erased or corrupted.

2. If the second stage bootloader is encrypted, but the partition table is re-flashed with a **plaintext partition table image**, the bootloader will fail to read the partition table resulting in the following failure:

  .. code-block:: bash

      rst:0x3 (SW_RESET),boot:0x13 (SPI_FAST_FLASH_BOOT)
      configsip: 0, SPIWP:0xee
      clk_drv:0x00,q_drv:0x00,d_drv:0x00,cs0_drv:0x00,hd_drv:0x00,wp_drv:0x00
      mode:DIO, clock div:2
      load:0x3fff0018,len:4
      load:0x3fff001c,len:10464
      ho 0 tail 12 room 4
      load:0x40078000,len:19168
      load:0x40080400,len:6664
      entry 0x40080764
      I (60) boot: ESP-IDF v4.0-dev-763-g2c55fae6c-dirty 2nd stage bootloader
      I (60) boot: compile time 19:15:54
      I (62) boot: Enabling RNG early entropy source...
      I (67) boot: SPI Speed      : 40MHz
      I (72) boot: SPI Mode       : DIO
      I (76) boot: SPI Flash Size : 4MB
      E (80) flash_parts: partition 0 invalid magic number 0x94f6
      E (86) boot: Failed to verify partition table
      E (91) boot: load partition table error!

3. If the bootloader and partition table are encrypted, but the application is re-flashed with a **plaintext application image**, the bootloader will fail to load the application resulting in the following failure:

  .. code-block:: bash

      rst:0x3 (SW_RESET),boot:0x13 (SPI_FAST_FLASH_BOOT)
      configsip: 0, SPIWP:0xee
      clk_drv:0x00,q_drv:0x00,d_drv:0x00,cs0_drv:0x00,hd_drv:0x00,wp_drv:0x00
      mode:DIO, clock div:2
      load:0x3fff0018,len:4
      load:0x3fff001c,len:8452
      load:0x40078000,len:13616
      load:0x40080400,len:6664
      entry 0x40080764
      I (56) boot: ESP-IDF v4.0-dev-850-gc4447462d-dirty 2nd stage bootloader
      I (56) boot: compile time 15:37:14
      I (58) boot: Enabling RNG early entropy source...
      I (64) boot: SPI Speed      : 40MHz
      I (68) boot: SPI Mode       : DIO
      I (72) boot: SPI Flash Size : 4MB
      I (76) boot: Partition Table:
      I (79) boot: ## Label            Usage          Type ST Offset   Length
      I (87) boot:  0 nvs              WiFi data        01 02 0000a000 00006000
      I (94) boot:  1 phy_init         RF data          01 01 00010000 00001000
      I (102) boot:  2 factory          factory app      00 00 00020000 00100000
      I (109) boot: End of partition table
      E (113) esp_image: image at 0x20000 has invalid magic byte
      W (120) esp_image: image at 0x20000 has invalid SPI mode 108
      W (126) esp_image: image at 0x20000 has invalid SPI size 11
      E (132) boot: Factory app partition is not bootable
      E (138) boot: No bootable app partitions in the partition table


.. _flash-encryption-status:

{IDF_TARGET_NAME} Flash Encryption Status
-----------------------------------------

Ensure that you have an {IDF_TARGET_NAME} device with default flash encryption eFuse settings as shown in :ref:`flash-encryption-efuse`.

To check if flash encryption on your {IDF_TARGET_NAME} device is enabled, do one of the following:

- flash the application example :example:`security/flash_encryption` onto your device. This application prints the ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` eFuse value and if flash encryption is enabled or disabled.

- :doc:`Find the serial port name <../get-started/establish-serial-connection>` under which your {IDF_TARGET_NAME} device is connected, replace ``PORT`` with your port name in the following command, and run it:

  .. code-block:: bash

      idf.py efuse-summary


.. _reading-writing-content:

Reading and Writing Data in Encrypted Flash
-------------------------------------------

{IDF_TARGET_NAME} application code can check if flash encryption is currently enabled by calling :cpp:func:`esp_efuse_is_flash_encryption_enabled`. Also, a device can identify the flash encryption mode by calling :cpp:func:`esp_get_flash_encryption_mode`.

Once flash encryption is enabled, be more careful with accessing flash contents from code.


Scope of Flash Encryption
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Whenever the ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` eFuse is set to a value with an odd number of bits, all flash content accessed via the MMU's flash cache is transparently decrypted. It includes:

- Executable application code in flash (IROM).
- All read-only data stored in flash (DROM).
- Any data accessed via :cpp:func:`spi_flash_mmap`.
- The second stage bootloader image when it is read by the first stage (ROM) bootloader.

.. important::

    The MMU flash cache unconditionally decrypts all existing data. Data which is stored unencrypted in flash memory will also be "transparently decrypted" via the flash cache and will appear to software as random garbage.


Reading from Encrypted Flash
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

To read data without using a flash cache MMU mapping, you can use the partition read function :cpp:func:`esp_partition_read`. This function will only decrypt data when it is read from an encrypted partition. Data read from unencrypted partitions will not be decrypted. In this way, software can access encrypted and non-encrypted flash in the same way.

You can also use the following SPI flash API functions:

- :cpp:func:`esp_flash_read` to read raw (encrypted) data which will not be decrypted
- :cpp:func:`esp_flash_read_encrypted` to read and decrypt data

Data stored using the Non-Volatile Storage (NVS) API is always stored and read decrypted from the perspective of flash encryption. It is up to the library to provide encryption feature if required. Refer to :doc:`../api-reference/storage/nvs_encryption` for more details.


Writing to Encrypted Flash
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

It is recommended to use the partition write function :cpp:func:`esp_partition_write`. This function will only encrypt data when it is written to an encrypted partition. Data written to unencrypted partitions will not be encrypted. In this way, software can access encrypted and non-encrypted flash in the same way.

You can also pre-encrypt and write data using the function :cpp:func:`esp_flash_write_encrypted`

Also, the following ROM functions exist but are not supported in ESP-IDF applications:

- ``esp_rom_spiflash_write_encrypted`` pre-encrypts and writes data to flash
- ``SPIWrite`` writes unencrypted data to flash

Since data is encrypted in blocks, the minimum write size for encrypted data is 16 bytes and the alignment is also 16 bytes.


.. _updating-encrypted-flash:

Updating Encrypted Flash
------------------------

.. _updating-encrypted-flash-ota:

OTA Updates
^^^^^^^^^^^

OTA updates to encrypted partitions will automatically write encrypted data if the function :cpp:func:`esp_partition_write` is used.

Before building the application image for OTA updating of an already encrypted device, enable the option :ref:`Enable flash encryption on boot <CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENC_ENABLED>` in project configuration menu.

For general information about ESP-IDF OTA updates, please refer to :doc:`OTA <../api-reference/system/ota>`.


.. _updating-encrypted-flash-serial:

Updating Encrypted Flash via Serial
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Flashing an encrypted device via serial bootloader requires that the serial bootloader download interface has not been permanently disabled via eFuse.

In development mode, the recommended method is :ref:`encrypt-partitions`.

In release mode, if a copy of the same key stored in eFuse is available on the host then it is possible to pre-encrypt files on the host and then flash them. See :ref:`manual-encryption`.

Disabling Flash Encryption
--------------------------

If flash encryption was enabled accidentally, flashing of plaintext data will soft-brick the {IDF_TARGET_NAME}. The device will reboot continuously, printing the error ``flash read err, 1000`` or ``invalid header: 0xXXXXXX``.

.. only:: esp32

  For flash encryption in development mode, encryption can be disabled by burning the ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` eFuse. It can only be done three times per chip by taking the following steps:

.. only:: not esp32

  For flash encryption in development mode, encryption can be disabled by burning the ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` eFuse. It can only be done one time per chip by taking the following steps:

#. In :ref:`project-configuration-menu`, disable :ref:`Enable flash encryption on boot <CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_ENC_ENABLED>`, then save and exit.
#. Open project configuration menu again and **double-check** that you have disabled this option! If this option is left enabled, the bootloader will immediately re-enable encryption when it boots.
#. With flash encryption disabled, build and flash the new bootloader and application by running ``idf.py flash``.
#. Use ``idf.py`` to disable the ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` by running:

  .. code-block:: bash

      idf.py efuse-burn {IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}

Reset the {IDF_TARGET_NAME}. Flash encryption will be disabled, and the bootloader will boot as usual.


Key Points About Flash Encryption
---------------------------------

.. list::

  :esp32: - Flash memory contents is encrypted using AES-256. The flash encryption key is stored in the ``flash_encryption`` eFuse internal to the chip and, by default, is protected from software access.

  :esp32: - The flash encryption algorithm is AES-256, where the key is "tweaked" with the offset address of each 32 byte block of flash. This means that every 32-byte block (two consecutive 16 byte AES blocks) is encrypted with a unique key derived from the flash encryption key.

  :SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_256 and SOC_KEY_MANAGER_SUPPORTED: - Flash memory contents are encrypted using XTS-AES-128 or XTS-AES-256. The flash encryption key is 256 bits and 512 bits respectively and stored in one or two ``BLOCK_KEYN`` eFuses internal to the chip and, by default, is protected from software access.

  :SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_256 and not SOC_KEY_MANAGER_SUPPORTED: - Flash memory contents are encrypted using XTS-AES-128 or XTS-AES-256, with respective key sizes of 256 or 512 bits. If using an eFuse-based key, the key is stored in one or two internal ``BLOCK_KEYN`` eFuses. However, if using a Key Manager-based key, the key is stored within the Key Manager itself. In either case, the key is protected from software access by default.

  :SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_128 and not SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_256 and not SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_128_DERIVED: - Flash memory contents is encrypted using XTS-AES-128. The flash encryption key is 256 bits and stored in one ``BLOCK_KEYN`` eFuse internal to the chip and, by default, is protected from software access.

  :SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_128_DERIVED: - Flash memory contents is encrypted using XTS-AES-128. The flash encryption key is 256 or 128 bits and stored in ``BLOCK_KEY0`` eFuse internal to the chip and, by default, is protected from software access.

  - Flash access is transparent via the flash cache mapping feature of {IDF_TARGET_NAME} - any flash regions which are mapped to the address space will be transparently decrypted when read.

    Some data partitions might need to remain unencrypted for ease of access or might require the use of flash-friendly update algorithms which are ineffective if the data is encrypted. NVS partitions for non-volatile storage cannot be encrypted since the NVS library is not directly compatible with flash encryption. For details, refer to :doc:`NVS Encryption <../api-reference/storage/nvs_encryption>`.

  - If flash encryption might be used in future, the programmer must keep it in mind and take certain precautions when writing code that :ref:`uses encrypted flash <reading-writing-content>`.

  - If secure boot is enabled, re-flashing the bootloader of an encrypted device requires a "Re-flashable" secure boot digest (see :ref:`flash-encryption-and-secure-boot`).

Enabling flash encryption will increase the size of bootloader, which might require updating partition table offset. See :ref:`bootloader-size`.

.. important::

    Do not interrupt power to the {IDF_TARGET_NAME} while the first boot encryption pass is running. If power is interrupted, the flash contents will be corrupted and will require flashing with unencrypted data again. In this case, re-flashing will not count towards the flashing limit.


.. _flash-encryption-limitations:

Limitations of Flash Encryption
-------------------------------

Flash encryption protects firmware against unauthorised readout and modification. It is important to understand the limitations of the flash encryption feature:

.. list::

    - Flash encryption is only as strong as the key. For this reason, we recommend keys are generated on the device during first boot (default behaviour). If generating keys off-device, ensure proper procedure is followed and do not share the same key between all production devices.
    - Not all data is stored encrypted. If storing data on flash, check if the method you are using (library, API, etc.) supports flash encryption.
    - Flash encryption does not prevent an attacker from understanding the high-level layout of the flash. This is because the same AES key is used for every pair of adjacent 16 byte AES blocks. When these adjacent 16 byte blocks contain identical content (such as empty or padding areas), these blocks will encrypt to produce matching pairs of encrypted blocks. This may allow an attacker to make high-level comparisons between encrypted devices (i.e., to tell if two devices are probably running the same firmware version).
    :esp32: - For the same reason, an attacker can always tell when a pair of adjacent 16 byte blocks (32 byte aligned) contain two identical 16 byte sequences. Keep this in mind if storing sensitive data on the flash, design your flash storage so this does not happen (using a counter byte or some other non-identical value every 16 bytes is sufficient). :doc:`NVS Encryption <../api-reference/storage/nvs_encryption>` deals with this and is suitable for many uses.
    - Flash encryption alone may not prevent an attacker from modifying the firmware of the device. To prevent unauthorised firmware from running on the device, use flash encryption in combination with :doc:`Secure Boot <secure-boot-v2>`.

.. _flash-encryption-and-secure-boot:

Flash Encryption and Secure Boot
---------------------------------

It is recommended to use flash encryption in combination with Secure Boot. However, if Secure Boot is enabled, additional restrictions apply to device re-flashing:

- :ref:`updating-encrypted-flash-ota` are not restricted, provided that the new app is signed correctly with the Secure Boot signing key.

.. only:: esp32

    - :ref:`Plaintext serial flash updates <updating-encrypted-flash-serial>` are only possible if the :ref:`Re-flashable <CONFIG_SECURE_BOOTLOADER_MODE>` Secure Boot mode is selected and a Secure Boot key was pre-generated and burned to the {IDF_TARGET_NAME} (refer to :ref:`Secure Boot <secure-boot-reflashable>`). In such configuration, ``idf.py bootloader`` will produce a pre-digested bootloader and secure boot digest file for flashing at offset 0x0. When following the plaintext serial re-flashing steps it is necessary to re-flash this file before flashing other plaintext data.

    - :ref:`Re-flashing via Pregenerated Flash Encryption Key <pregenerated-flash-encryption-key>` is still possible, provided the bootloader is not re-flashed. Re-flashing the bootloader requires the same :ref:`Re-flashable <CONFIG_SECURE_BOOTLOADER_MODE>` option to be enabled in the Secure Boot config.

.. only:: SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_SUPPORT_PSEUDO_ROUND and SOC_ECDSA_SUPPORT_CURVE_P384

  - It is recommended that the required strength of the :ref:`xts-aes-pseudo-round-func` should be set during the first boot when flash encryption release mode is enabled. If your workflow needs to update the function's strength after the first boot, you should enable :ref:`CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_SKIP_WRITE_PROTECTION_SCA` to avoid write-protecting this bit during boot.

.. _flash-encryption-advanced-features:

Advanced Features
-----------------

The following section covers advanced features of flash encryption.

.. _encrypted-partition-flag:

Encrypted Partition Flag
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Some partitions are encrypted by default. Other partitions can be marked in the partition table description as requiring encryption by adding the flag ``encrypted`` to the partitions' flag field. As a result, data in these marked partitions will be treated as encrypted in the same manner as an app partition.

.. code-block:: bash

   # Name,   Type, SubType, Offset,  Size, Flags
   nvs,      data, nvs,     0x9000,  0x6000
   phy_init, data, phy,     0xf000,  0x1000
   factory,  app,  factory, 0x10000, 1M
   secret_data, 0x40, 0x01, 0x20000, 256K, encrypted

For details on partition table description, see :doc:`partition table <../api-guides/partition-tables>`.

Further information about encryption of partitions:

- Default partition tables do not include any encrypted data partitions.
- With flash encryption enabled, the ``app`` partition is always treated as encrypted and does not require marking.
- If flash encryption is not enabled, the flag "encrypted" has no effect.
- You can also consider protecting ``phy_init`` data from physical access, readout, or modification, by marking the optional ``phy`` partition with the flag ``encrypted``.
- The ``nvs`` partition cannot be encrypted, because the NVS library is not directly compatible with flash encryption.


.. _uart-bootloader-encryption:

Enabling UART Bootloader Encryption/Decryption
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

On the first boot, the flash encryption process burns by default the following eFuses:

.. only:: esp32

  - ``DISABLE_DL_ENCRYPT`` which disables flash encryption operation when running in UART bootloader boot mode.
  - ``DISABLE_DL_DECRYPT`` which disables transparent flash decryption when running in UART bootloader mode, even if the eFuse ``{IDF_TARGET_CRYPT_CNT}`` is set to enable it in normal operation.
  - ``DISABLE_DL_CACHE`` which disables the entire MMU flash cache when running in UART bootloader mode.

.. only:: not esp32

  .. list::

    - ``DIS_DOWNLOAD_MANUAL_ENCRYPT`` which disables flash encryption operation when running in UART bootloader boot mode.
    :SOC_EFUSE_DIS_DOWNLOAD_ICACHE and SOC_EFUSE_DIS_DOWNLOAD_DCACHE: - ``DIS_DOWNLOAD_ICACHE`` and ``DIS_DOWNLOAD_DCACHE`` which disables the entire MMU flash cache when running in UART bootloader mode.
    :SOC_EFUSE_DIS_DOWNLOAD_ICACHE and not SOC_EFUSE_DIS_DOWNLOAD_DCACHE: - ``DIS_DOWNLOAD_ICACHE`` which disables the entire MMU flash cache when running in UART bootloader mode.
    :esp32s2: - ``HARD_DIS_JTAG`` which disables JTAG.
    :SOC_EFUSE_DIS_PAD_JTAG and SOC_EFUSE_DIS_USB_JTAG: - ``DIS_PAD_JTAG`` and ``DIS_USB_JTAG`` which disables JTAG.
    :SOC_EFUSE_HARD_DIS_JTAG and SOC_EFUSE_DIS_USB_JTAG: - ``HARD_DIS_JTAG`` and ``DIS_USB_JTAG`` which disables JTAG.
    - ``DIS_DIRECT_BOOT`` (old name ``DIS_LEGACY_SPI_BOOT``)  which disables direct boot mode
    :SOC_EFUSE_DIS_DOWNLOAD_MSPI: - ``DIS_DOWNLOAD_MSPI`` which disables the MSPI access in download mode.

However, before the first boot you can choose to keep any of these features enabled by burning only selected eFuses and write-protect the rest of eFuses with unset value 0. For example:

.. only:: esp32

  .. code-block:: bash

    idf.py --port PORT efuse-burn DISABLE_DL_DECRYPT
    idf.py --port PORT efuse-write-protect DISABLE_DL_ENCRYPT

.. only:: not esp32

  .. code-block:: bash

    idf.py --port PORT efuse-burn DIS_DOWNLOAD_MANUAL_ENCRYPT
    idf.py --port PORT efuse-write-protect DIS_DOWNLOAD_MANUAL_ENCRYPT

  .. note::

      Set all appropriate bits before write-protecting!

      Write protection of all the three eFuses is controlled by one bit. It means that write-protecting one eFuse bit will inevitably write-protect all unset eFuse bits.

  Write protecting these eFuses to keep them unset is not currently very useful, as ``esptool`` does not support reading encrypted flash.

.. only:: esp32

  .. important::

      Leaving ``DISABLE_DL_DECRYPT`` unset (0) makes flash encryption useless.

      An attacker with physical access to the chip can use UART bootloader mode with custom stub code to read out the flash contents.


.. only:: esp32

  .. _setting-flash-crypt-config:

  Setting FLASH_CRYPT_CONFIG
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

  The eFuse ``FLASH_CRYPT_CONFIG`` determines the number of bits in the flash encryption key which are "tweaked" with the block offset. For details, see :ref:`flash-encryption-algorithm`.

  On the first boot of the second stage bootloader, this value is set to the maximum ``0xF``.

  It is possible to burn this eFuse manually and write protect it before the first boot in order to select different tweak values. However, this is not recommended.

  It is strongly recommended to never write-protect ``FLASH_CRYPT_CONFIG`` when it is unset. Otherwise, its value will remain zero permanently, and no bits in the flash encryption key will be tweaked. As a result, the flash encryption algorithm will be equivalent to AES ECB mode.

JTAG Debugging
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

By default, when Flash Encryption is enabled (in either development or release mode) then JTAG debugging is disabled via eFuse. The bootloader does this on first boot, at the same time it enables flash encryption.

See :ref:`jtag-debugging-security-features` for more information about using JTAG Debugging with Flash Encryption.


.. _manual-encryption:

Manually Encrypting Files
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

.. only:: SOC_KEY_MANAGER_SUPPORTED

  Manually encrypting or decrypting files requires the flash encryption key to be deployed in the Key Manager or pre-burned in eFuses (see :ref:`pregenerated-flash-encryption-key`) and a copy to be kept on the host. If the flash encryption is configured in development mode, then it is not necessary to keep a copy of the key or follow these steps. The simpler :ref:`encrypt-partitions` steps can be used.

.. only:: not SOC_KEY_MANAGER_SUPPORTED

  Manually encrypting or decrypting files requires the flash encryption key to be pre-burned in eFuse (see :ref:`pregenerated-flash-encryption-key`) and a copy to be kept on the host. If the flash encryption is configured in development mode, then it is not necessary to keep a copy of the key or follow these steps. The simpler :ref:`encrypt-partitions` steps can be used.

The key file should be a single raw binary file (example: ``key.bin``).

For example, these are the steps to encrypt the file ``my-app.bin`` to flash at offset 0x10000. Run ``idf.py`` as follows:

.. only:: esp32

    .. code-block:: bash

       idf.py secure-encrypt-flash-data --keyfile /path/to/key.bin --address 0x10000 --output my-app-ciphertext.bin my-app.bin

.. only:: not esp32

    .. code-block:: bash

       idf.py secure-encrypt-flash-data --aes-xts --keyfile /path/to/key.bin --address 0x10000 --output my-app-ciphertext.bin my-app.bin

The file ``my-app-ciphertext.bin`` can then be flashed to offset 0x10000 using ``esptool``. To see all of the command line options recommended for ``esptool``, see the output printed when ``idf.py build`` succeeds.

.. note::

  If the flashed ciphertext file is not recognized by the {IDF_TARGET_NAME} when it boots, check that the keys match and that the command line arguments match exactly, including the correct offset.

  .. only:: esp32

    If your ESP32 uses non-default :ref:`FLASH_CRYPT_CONFIG value in eFuse <setting-flash-crypt-config>` then you will need to pass the ``--flash-crypt-conf`` argument to ``idf.py`` command to set the matching value. This will not happen if the device configured flash encryption by itself, but may happen if burning eFuses manually to enable flash encryption.

The command ``idf.py decrypt-flash-data`` can be used with the same options (and different input/output files), to decrypt ciphertext flash contents or a previously encrypted file.


.. only:: SOC_SPIRAM_SUPPORTED and not esp32

  External RAM
  ------------

  .. only:: SOC_PSRAM_ENCRYPTION_PAGE_CONFIGURABLE

    When Flash Encryption is enabled any data read from and written to external SPI RAM through the cache can also be encrypted/decrypted. On {IDF_TARGET_NAME}, PSRAM encryption can be controlled on a per-MMU-page basis, allowing individual PSRAM pages to be selectively encrypted or left unencrypted. However, in the default configuration, all PSRAM pages are encrypted when flash encryption is enabled.

  .. only:: not SOC_PSRAM_ENCRYPTION_PAGE_CONFIGURABLE

    When Flash Encryption is enabled any data read from and written to external SPI RAM through the cache will also be encrypted/decrypted. If Flash Encryption is enabled then encryption for external SPI RAM is also automatically enabled.

  .. only:: SOC_PSRAM_ENCRYPTION_SEPARATE_KEY

    On {IDF_TARGET_NAME}, PSRAM encryption can use an independent encryption key. If the PSRAM encryption key is not programmed, the flash encryption key will be used as the PSRAM encryption key.


Technical Details
-----------------

The following sections provide some reference information about the operation of flash encryption.

.. only:: not SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES

  .. _flash-encryption-algorithm:

  Flash Encryption Algorithm
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

  - AES-256 operates on 16-byte blocks of data. The flash encryption engine encrypts and decrypts data in 32-byte blocks - two AES blocks in series.

  - The main flash encryption key is stored in the ``flash_encryption`` eFuse and, by default, is protected from further writes or software readout.

  - AES-256 key size is 256 bits (32 bytes) read from the ``flash_encryption`` eFuse. The hardware AES engine uses the key in reversed byte order as compared to the storage order in ``flash_encryption``.

    - If the ``CODING_SCHEME`` eFuse is set to ``0`` (default, "None" Coding Scheme) then the eFuse key block is 256 bits and the key is stored as-is (in reversed byte order).
    - If the ``CODING_SCHEME`` eFuse is set to ``1`` (3/4 Encoding) then the eFuse key block is 192 bits (in reversed byte order), so overall entropy is reduced. The hardware flash encryption still operates on a 256-bit key, after being read (and un-reversed), the key is extended as ``key = key[0:255] + key[64:127]``.

  - AES algorithm is used inverted in flash encryption, so the flash encryption "encrypt" operation is AES decrypt and the "decrypt" operation is AES encrypt. This is for performance reasons and does not alter the efficiency of the algorithm.

  - Each 32-byte block (two adjacent 16-byte AES blocks) is encrypted with a unique key. The key is derived from the main flash encryption key in ``flash_encryption``, XORed with the offset of this block in the flash (a "key tweak").

  - The specific tweak depends on the ``FLASH_CRYPT_CONFIG`` eFuse setting. This is a 4-bit eFuse where each bit enables XORing of a particular range of the key bits:

    - Bit 1, bits 0-66 of the key are XORed.
    - Bit 2, bits 67-131 of the key are XORed.
    - Bit 3, bits 132-194 of the key are XORed.
    - Bit 4, bits 195-256 of the key are XORed.

    It is recommended that ``FLASH_CRYPT_CONFIG`` is always left at the default value ``0xF``, so that all key bits are XORed with the block offset. For details, see :ref:`setting-flash-crypt-config`.

  - The high 19 bits of the block offset (bit 5 to bit 23) are XORed with the main flash encryption key. This range is chosen for two reasons: the maximum flash size is 16MB (24 bits), and each block is 32 bytes so the least significant 5 bits are always zero.

  - There is a particular mapping from each of the 19 block offset bits to the 256 bits of the flash encryption key to determine which bit is XORed with which. See the variable ``_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_TWEAK_PATTERN`` in the ``espsecure`` source code for complete mapping.

  - To see the full flash encryption algorithm implemented in Python, refer to the ``_flash_encryption_operation()`` function in the ``espsecure`` source code.

.. only:: SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_256

  .. _flash-encryption-algorithm:

  Flash Encryption Algorithm
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

  - {IDF_TARGET_NAME} use the XTS-AES block cipher mode with 256-bit or 512-bit key size for flash encryption.

  - XTS-AES is a block cipher mode specifically designed for disc encryption and addresses the weaknesses other potential modes (e.g., AES-CTR) have for this use case. A detailed description of the XTS-AES algorithm can be found in `IEEE Std 1619-2007 <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4493450>`_.

  - The flash encryption key is stored in one or two ``BLOCK_KEYN`` eFuses and, by default, is protected from further writes or software readout.

  - To see the full flash encryption algorithm implemented in Python, refer to the ``_flash_encryption_operation()`` function in the ``espsecure`` source code.

.. only:: SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_128 and not SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_256 and not SOC_EFUSE_CONSISTS_OF_ONE_KEY_BLOCK


  .. _flash-encryption-algorithm:

  Flash Encryption Algorithm
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

  - {IDF_TARGET_NAME} use the XTS-AES block cipher mode with 256-bit size for flash encryption.

  - XTS-AES is a block cipher mode specifically designed for disc encryption and addresses the weaknesses other potential modes (e.g., AES-CTR) have for this use case. A detailed description of the XTS-AES algorithm can be found in `IEEE Std 1619-2007 <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4493450>`_.

  - The flash encryption key is stored in one ``BLOCK_KEYN`` eFuse and, by default, is protected from further writes or software readout.

  - To see the full flash encryption algorithm implemented in Python, refer to the `_flash_encryption_operation()` function in the ``espsecure`` source code.

.. only:: SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_128 and SOC_EFUSE_CONSISTS_OF_ONE_KEY_BLOCK

  .. _flash-encryption-algorithm:

  Flash Encryption Algorithm
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

  - {IDF_TARGET_NAME} use the XTS-AES block cipher mode with 256-bit size for flash encryption. In case the 128-bit key is stored in the eFuse key block, the final 256-bit AES key is obtained as SHA256(EFUSE_KEY0_FE_128BIT).

  - XTS-AES is a block cipher mode specifically designed for disc encryption and addresses the weaknesses other potential modes (e.g., AES-CTR) have for this use case. A detailed description of the XTS-AES algorithm can be found in `IEEE Std 1619-2007 <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4493450>`_.

  - The flash encryption key is stored in ``BLOCK_KEY0`` eFuse and, by default, is protected from further writes or software readout.

  - To see the full flash encryption algorithm implemented in Python, refer to the `_flash_encryption_operation()` function in the ``espsecure`` source code.

.. only:: SOC_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_XTS_AES_SUPPORT_PSEUDO_ROUND

  Protection Against Side-Channel Attacks
  ---------------------------------------

  .. _xts-aes-pseudo-round-func:

  Pseudo-Round Function
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

  {IDF_TARGET_NAME} incorporates a pseudo-round function in the XTS-AES peripheral, thus enabling the peripheral to randomly insert pseudo-rounds before and after the original operation rounds and also generate a pseudo key to perform these dummy operations.
  These operations do not alter the original result, but they increase the complexity to perform side channel analysis attacks by randomizing the power profile.

  :ref:`CONFIG_SECURE_FLASH_PSEUDO_ROUND_FUNC_STRENGTH` can be used to select the strength of the pseudo-round function. Increasing the strength improves the security provided, but would slow down the XTS-AES operations.

  .. list-table:: Performance impact on XTS-AES operations per strength level
      :widths: 10 10
      :header-rows: 1
      :align: center

      * - **Strength**
        - **Performance Impact** [#]_
      * - Low
        - < 0.5 %
      * - Medium
        - 6.2 %
      * - High
        - 18 %

  .. [#] The above performance numbers have been calculated using the XTS-AES test of the HAL crypto test app :component_file:`test_xts_aes.c <esp_hal_security/test_apps/crypto/main/xts_aes/test_xts_aes.c>`.

  You can configure the strength of the pseudo rounds functions according to your use cases. For example, increasing the strength would provide higher security but would slow down the flash encryption/decryption operations.

  Considering the above performance impact, ESP-IDF by-default enables low strength configuration for the pseudo-round function for minimal performance impact.
